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The legal profession adheres to a story of a unified profession. Nevertheless, the profession has distinct professionalsub-groups which repeatedly
represent clients with interests adverse to those represented by attorneys who
identify with other sub-groups. The idea of "professionalidentity as advocacy" describes how such professional sub-groups accuse opposing subgroups of greed, self-aggrandizement,or worse. This is most notable in two
areas: personal injury litigation and criminal cases. This process has two
seemingly contradictory consequences. First, it renders narrow areas extraordinarilyvisible, thus defining popular discourse and conceptions about
lawyers and law. Second, it masks vast areas of litigation and law that have a
fundamental impact on social justice yet do not generate the "profile" triggered where professional identity as advocacy is at its most intense. This
Article explores the nature and consequences of professional identity as advocacy and examines the degree to which this dynamic can or should change.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The legal profession adheres to a story of a single, unified profession.
The Rules of Professional Conduct, with only minor exceptions, apply to all
lawyers, whatever type of law they practice.'

Qualifications to obtain ad-

mission to the bar-graduation from law school, character and fitness review, the bar exam itself-similarly operate under the assumption that
1. See infra text accompanying notes 20-25.
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lawyers follow identical norms however divergent the type of law they ultimately pursue. 2
Groups of lawyers, however, have distinct professional sub-identities
that distinguish them from other segments of the profession, particularly
when the two segments repeatedly represent clients with adverse interests.
This is most notable in the two areas that most capture popular and political attention: personal injury litigation and criminal justice. Popular culture defines these areas as what the practice of law is.' It is precisely in
these areas that a process I call "professional identity as advocacy" is most
strident and fundamental. This process entails one group of practitioners
advocating on behalf of themselves as an "in group" against an "out
group," while another group of practitioners view the situation in reverse:
they view themselves as the "in group" and the prior "in group" as the "out
group." The crux of the professional identity concept is that these distinct
professional groups oppose one another over and over again, and, as a result, each accuses the other of greed, self-aggrandizement, or worse. As
articulated in this discourse, the stakes of who "wins" this battle are extraordinary: each side carries the banner of the public good-all the public
good. The result evokes classic narratives of good versus evil. Such narratives not only embody archetypes of good and evil, but also the monumental consequences that hinge on the battle's outcome: the fate of the world,
sometimes quite literally, hangs in the balance, dependent on whether the
"good guys" defeat the "bad guys."'
A striking dimension of professional advocacy as identity is that it surfaces only in these relatively limited areas of practice. Other hugely important segments of the profession operate almost completely under the radar
screen. One example is commercial litigation, which ordinarily entails
highly resourced clients who almost always employ large law firms. As a
rule, large law firms have professional identity only insofar as they represent large organizations. There is no moral or political spin to their
client list: in most instances a large organization opposes another large organization.' It is not the "people" against a "criminal": it is not "the little
guy" against the "bad guy."
Another example of "under the radar screen" litigation is the extraordinarily large number of litigants who litigate in "mass justice" courts.'
There is indeed professional identity as advocacy in this arena, with a corps
of lawyers representing, in most cases, more heavily resourced partiescreditors, landlords, the government-against a tiny corps of lawyers who
provide free legal services to low-income litigants, albeit a small percentage
of them. The irony here, though, is that there are so few lawyers with so
2. See infra text accompanying notes 29-34.
3. See supra text accompanying notes 66-69.
4. See ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAw 83-84 (2000) (quoting ELAINE PAGELS, THE ORIGIN OF SATAN 105 (1995) (referring to stories embodying cultural norms
which "draw the battle lines between 'the sons of light' and the 'sons of darkness' ")).
5. See infra text accompanying note 168.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 142-52.
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few resources engaged in this arena that the "battle," to a large extent,
remains invisible. A further irony is that this invisibility masks the massive
social costs and tragic consequences underlying this type of litigation. Put
another way, here is an area where a little professional identity as advocacy
might not be such a bad thing, but a key ingredient to get the stories told to
a wider audience-resources-does not exist.
All of these dynamics have multiple consequences. It contributes to
the low regard in which the profession is held because stories of professional gain at the expense of the public good tend to tarnish all lawyers.
The entrenched battle lines and demonization of the "other" inhibit professional collaboration outside individual client representation. Such collaboration might enhance the administration of justice and legal reform in both
civil and criminal law. It also obscures the deplorable state of access to
justice.
This Article explores these issues in five parts. The first part traces the
history of specialization within the legal profession. The second part explores the cognitive and social basis for professional advocacy-the creation of "in groups" and "out groups." The third part describes the two
primary examples of professional advocacy that capture the attention of
the public: personal injury litigation and criminal justice. The fourth part
tackles two areas that, for very different reasons, are not subject to public
scrutiny: commercial litigation involving large business enterprises and individual representation in courts of mass justice. The final part explores
the consequences of professional identity as advocacy on the profession
and society more generally.'
II.

OVERVIEW: THE UNITARY PROFESSION

A first step in examining professional identity as advocacy is to trace
the arc of attorneys' identity over time. Virtually every discussion that excoriates the current state of the profession' recalls a misty past where the
7. I will not address two trends in the legal profession that have been covered in detail elsewhere. One is the socioeconomic, racial, and gender trends within the profession. See RICHARD L.
ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERs 85, 109 (1989). See also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAw 488-90 (3d ed. 2005). Another is the decline of "professionalism." There are innumerable
bar journal articles on the subject of a growing number of "civility codes" that seek to reign in the
"Rambo tactics" of litigators. For some academic treatments of the subject, see Christopher J. Piazzaola, Ethical Versus ProceduralApproaches to Civility: Why Ethics 2000 Should Have Adopted a Civility Rule, 74 U. COLo. L. REV. 1197 (2003); Warren E. Burger, The Decline of Professionalism,61 TENN.
L. REV. 1 (1993). For an overview of cases involving uncivil lawyers, see Josh O'Ohara, Creating Civility: Using Reference Group Theory to Improve Inter-Lawyer Relations, 31 VT. L. REV. 965, 966-67
(2007). In contrast, for a critique of the "civility" debate as reflecting powerful interests within the bar
itself, see Amy R. Mashburn, Professionalism as Class Ideology: Civility Codes and Bar Hierarchy, 28
VAL. U. L. REV. 657 (1994). These themes are of great importance and I will refer to them at times, but
my purpose here is to address professional segmentation that generates political and moral differentiation between categories of clients and the lawyers that represent them.
8. Consider the following statement of Carl T. Bogus: "The legal profession is dead or dying. It
is rotting away into an occupation. On this, those assembled at the bedside concur. . . ." Carl T. Bogus,
The Death of an Honorable Profession, 71 IND. L.J. 911, 911 (1996).
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profession truly was a "profession" characterized by integrity and professional service offered to all comers.' This section will examine this idea as
well as the notion that all lawyers are part of a common enterprise characterized by unity of goal and identity.
A.

The Rhetoric of Attorney "Independence": Two
HistoricalAntecedents

A classic conception of what being a lawyer is involves decoupling clients' cases from the advocate.10 Such decoupling creates a peculiar relationship: passionate advocacy on behalf of someone (or, in the case of
businesses, something) with the advocacy distinct from an attorney's personal beliefs. I will trace two historical examples that illustrate this paradigm of "independent" advocacy.
1. John Adams and the Boston Massacre
John Adams represented British soldiers accused of murder in the
Boston Massacre. This relatively unknown fact"-perhaps inconsistent
with the prevailing narrative of "patriots" against "loyalists"-demonstrates that in Adams' time the virtues of representing the despised-even
those whom the attorney might otherwise despise-was alive and well.
Consider the following entry from Adams' Diary from 1773, where he reflects on his role in the Boston Massacre trial which had occurred three
years earlier:
I ... devoted myself to endless labor and Anxiety if not to infamy and
death, and that for nothing, except, what indeed was and ought to be in all,
sense of duty . . . [I] incurr[ed] a Clamour and hazarding popular Suspi-

cions and prejudices which are not yet worn out and never will be forgotten . . . It was, however, one of the most gallant, generous, manly, and

disinterested Actions of my whole life, and one of the best Pieces of Service I ever rendered my Country."12
It is worth noting that Adams sees his act as "disinterested." He is not
his client and assumes the independent stance of advocate at a time when
popular passions regarding the preeminent political issue of his day were at
their zenith.1 3
9. See Marc Galanter, Lawyers in the Mist: The Golden Age of Legal Nostalgia, 100 DICK. L.
549 (1996).
10. Michael Ariens, Know the Law: A History of Legal Specialization, 45 S.C. L. REV. 1003, 1007
(1994).
11. There has, however, been a recent discussion of Adams' defense of British soldiers in the
Boston Massacre in the ABA's "Law Day" held in 2011. Ed Finkel, John Adams Gets His Day, 97
A.B.A. J. 56 (2011).
12. 3 JOHN ADAMS, DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN ADAMS 79 (L.H. Butterfield, ed.)
(1962).
13. Adams' defense is viewed as successful. Of his eight clients, six were acquitted and, although
two were found guilty, Adams succeeded in having their sentence reduced from death to branding. The
preeminent history of the Boston Massacre and the resulting trial and its aftermath is HILLER B.
ZOBEL, THE BOSTON MASSACRE (1970).
REV.
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2. Abraham Lincoln and the Country Lawyer
Abraham Lincoln, given his fame, serves well as a figure representing
so much of what the profession is currently not. While there is every reason to believe that Lincoln's contemporaries were generalists as he was,
there is no lawyer of his time who has been even remotely researched as
exhaustively as Lincoln. He can thus serve as a typical if (of course) extraordinarily notable lawyer of his time.
While Lincoln's general philosophy of practice is often encapsulated in
frequently repeated quotes,1 4 the cases he undertook neatly encapsulate
the paradigm of the non-specialist." He handled numerous debtor-creditor matters, representing both the debtors and the creditors. He represented railroad corporations-an enormously powerful business interest in
Lincoln's time-as well as individuals litigating against railroad corporations. He represented both in-state and out-of-state litigants in diversity
cases.16 While not an elected prosecutor, he assisted in prosecution by
drafting indictments, acting as co-counsel, and serving directly as a state's
attorney pro tem.17 At the same time Lincoln had an active criminal defense practice." He also practiced in what we would now call "transactional" work-real estate matters, trusts and estates, general legal advice to
individuals and businesses, and even patents.19
This caseload is notable for several reasons. The first is its breadth:
criminal law, debtor creditor, transactional practice, and commercial litigation-these embody knowledge of disparate substantive areas of the law
14. Perhaps his most famous is cited as a precursor to the mediation movement and conceptions
of more collaborative, problem-solving lawyering: "Discourage litigation. Persuade your neighbors to
compromise whenever you can. As a peacemaker, the lawyer has superior opportunity of being a good
man. There will be business enough." THE WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 15
(Philip Van Doren Stern ed., 1961).
15. John A. Lupton, THE LAW PRACTICE OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A NARRATIVE OVERVIEW,
http://www.papersofabrahamlincoln.org/narrativeoverview.htm (last visited May 21, 2012). See also
Ariens, supra note 10, at 1029 (Lincoln "practiced law in the traditional manner, representing clients in
all kinds of legal matters, and representing any clients who came to him"; "[h]e refused to let the
passions of the community determine the vigor of his defense of one who was criminally accused, and
he remained an independent lawyer who knew the whole field of law"). For a searchable database of
documents from cases in which Lincoln was involved, visit http://www.lawpracticeofabrahamlincoln.org/
Search.aspx.
16. This opposing representation is all the more remarkable because railroads succeeded in
transforming common law regarding who bears liability for property damages. Businesses, especially
railroads, feared the financial consequences of judgments awarded to plaintiffs. Consider the result:
"At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the law of nuisance provided an almost exclusive remedy
for indirect interferences with property rights, and courts were prepared to award damages for injury to
property regardless of social utility or absence of carelessness. By the time of the Civil War, by contrast, American courts had created a variety of legal doctrines whose primary effect was to force those
injured by economic activities to bear the cost of these improvements." MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860, at 70-71 (1977); see also HERBERT HoVENKAMP,
ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW 1836-1937, at 38-39 (1991) (tracing the development of the "public
use doctrine" to favor governmental subsidies to railroads).
17. Lupton, supra note 15.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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that few modern practitioners could claim to possess. What is more important for purposes of this Article is how Lincoln smoothly moved from one
"side" to another, representing criminal defendants to acting as prosecutor,
representing large organizational entities to litigating against those entities.
Here is Lincoln, like Adams before him, acting as the "disinterested" counselor who remains, as counselor, independent from those clients' interests.
B.

The Current Ideal of Generalism and Attorney Independence

Although widely critiqued, the rhetorical norms of the profession remain staunchly Lincolnesque.
First, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct largely remain rules of
general application, guiding all types of practice. While on very rare occasions some allowances are made for distinctive qualities of certain types of
practice, particularly criminal law,2 0 there is only a single rule out of 59 that
explicitly does so: Rule 3.8-"Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor." 2 1
While lawyers "may communicate the fact that the lawyer does or does not
practice in particular fields of law," there remains a strong policy against
taking this too far: in only rare cases can a "lawyer state or imply that a
lawyer is certified as a specialist in a particular field of law." 2 2 There has
been a relatively modest call for specialized sets of ethical requirements
that more closely reflect the different worlds in which lawyers practice. 2 3
Nevertheless, apart from binding codes regulating conduct before government agencies,2 4 these calls have led to little meaningful action by entities
that regulate lawyers.
The ethical rules further embody the longstanding norm of decoupling
the substance of representation from the content of representation. Under
the heading "Independence from Client's Views or Activities," the Model
20. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr R. 3.1 (2008) (making special allowances that a lawyer

for a criminal defendant may require that every element of the case be established); MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUcr R. 3.3(a)(3) (making special rules for reasonable belief about false testimony by a
criminal defendant). In both of these instances, constitutional rights for a criminal defendant explicitly
trump rules that otherwise apply in other contexts.
21. Arguably two other Rules address special roles an attorney might undertake: Rule 2.4
("Lawyer Serving as a Third-Party Neutral") and Rule 3.9 ("Advocate in Nonadjudicative Proceedings"). These examples, however, do not specify a special type of client-an important point given the
issues this Article seeks to address.
22. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucT R. 7.4. Interestingly, while such "certified specializa-

tions" are available to attorneys, only 3% of attorneys are so certified as compared to 80-90% of physicians. Thomas P. Sartwelle, Your Doctor is Board Certified. Is Your Lawyer?, 20 PROF'L L. 1 (2011).
One reason Sartwelle identifies for these figures is the notion that "formal specialization detracts from
a presumption that any licensed lawyer is competent to handle any legal problem." Id. at 20. Perhaps
this represents the continuing influence of the Lincolnesque paradigm.
23. For general calls in favor of such specialized codes, see Stanley Sporkin, The Need for Sepa149 (1993);
rate Codes of Professional Conduct for the Various Specialties, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL Eics
Fred Zacharias, Reconceptualizing Ethical Roles, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 169, 190 (1997) (collecting
citations to "specialized codes of conduct covering lawyers engaged in particular areas of practice").
24. The most prominent recent example of agency regulation of attorneys is the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, which, in the wake of the Enron scandal, called on the Securities and Exchange Commission to
pass a set of "minimum standard of professional conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing before
the Commission." 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2006). The SEC subsequently did so. 17 C.F.R. § 205 (2010).
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Rules state that "legal representation should not be denied to people . . .
whose cause is controversial or the subject of popular disapproval" and
''representing a client does not constitute approval of the client's views or
activities."25 John Adams would wholeheartedly approve.
Interestingly, the disjunction between the realities of practice and the
strict generalism of the Model Rules appears to be on the rise. Non-binding ethical codes and articles that do focus on distinct areas of practice are
proliferating. Examples include family law,26 admiralty, 27 and trusts and
estates.2 8 Professional identity is well illustrated here: the depth of professional identity in situ virtually has compelled these practitioners to craft
their own guidelines because the ethical rules guiding a unitary "professions" do not.
Another classic demonstration of the generalist paradigm is the law
school curriculum, which is virtually unchanged since the time of Christopher Columbus Langdell in the nineteenth century.29 The classic roster of
first year classes-Civil Procedure, Property, Torts, Criminal Law, and
Constitutional Law-is not about teaching the practice of criminal law or
the practice of civil litigation. Rather, the endlessly repeated declaration of
what legal education is about-"thinking like a lawyer"-has as its thrust
the idea that "thinking like a lawyer" is consistent across practice areas.3 0
Moreover, the ABA Standards for Approval of Law Schools remains
generalist in outlook,3 1 and even recent critiques of legal education view
"professional identity" in general ethical, social, and moral terms, none of
which are keyed to particular areas of practice.32
25. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. [5]. In somewhat contradictory fashion, the
Rules also note that a lawyer should "accept appointments" to represent clients "except for good
cause," one of which is "the client or the cause is so repugnant to the lawyer as to be likely to impair the
client-lawyer relationship or the lawyer's ability to represent the client." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 6.2(c).
26. See AM. ACAD. OF MATRIMONIAL LAWYERS, BOUNDS OF ADVOCACY (2000); see also Model

Standards of Practicefor Family and Divorce Mediation (2001).
27. William W. Wright, Jr., Admiralty Law Institute Symposium: The Uniqueness of Admiralty
and Maritime Law: Ethical Considerations in Representing Multiple Parties in Litigation, 79 TUL. L.
REV. 1523 (2005).
28. See AM. COLL. OF TRUSTS AND ESTATES COUNSEL FOUND., COMMENTARIES ON THE MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1993).
29. See ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850's TO

THE 1980's 52-53 (1983).
30. Indeed, legal education has traditionally eschewed "practice"-let alone specialized practice
areas-as worthy of much attention. Christopher Columbus Langdell offers a pure form of this idea: to
improve legal education it is "indispensable to establish at least two things: first, that the law was a
science; secondly, that all the available materials of that science are contained in printed books." Christopher C. Langdell, Address at the Commemoration of the 250th Anniversary of the Founding of
Harvard College (Nov. 5, 1886), in A RECORD OF THE COMMEMORATION, NOVEMBER FIFTH TO
EIGHTH, 1886, ON THE Two HUNDRED AND FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE FOUNDING OF HARVARD
COLLEGE 85 (1887).
31. ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS 302 (20102011) (requiring instruction in "substantive law" and "other professional skills" which are "generally
regarded as necessary for effective and responsible participation in the legal profession").
32. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PRO.

FESSION OF LAw 126-61 (2007). This influential study-usually referred to as the "Carnegie Report"focuses on improving legal education in general terms, not to improve legal education in terms of
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Finally, the Bar Exam, since its rise in the 1920's, is a reflection of the
pure generalism characteristic of the Model Rules and legal education.
The subjects tested are the familiar ones long required in law schools."
While the bar examination has come under intense scrutiny, 34 testing superficial familiarity with standard law school fare is what the bar examination continues to try to do. Unlike board certifications in medicine, a
barred lawyer can thus do anything without additional qualifications and
without demonstrating expertise through further assessments. A superficial test of general knowledge thus remains the core qualification for admission to the bar despite the increasing specialization of the legal
profession.
III.

PROFESSIONAL IDENTITY As ADVOCACY DEFINED

In contrast to the generalist paradigm, the profession has become increasingly specialized,3 s decoupled from the steadfast generalism of professional regulation, legal education, and the licensing process. While some
decry this trend, often building upon the generalist paradigm and recalling
the image of Lincoln, most practicing lawyers view specialization as necessary to earn a living in the market for legal services.3 6
Be that as it may, specialization has had another consequence: the creation of warring camps, groups of lawyers who exclusively represent one
side within a specialty. This is professional identity as advocacy. This Article will now trace an early, perceptive articulation of the idea, and then
explore how professional identity as advocacy has become a potent aspect
of today's legal landscape.

promoting substantive specialization. See also Roy STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION: A VISION AND A ROAD MAP 73 (2007) (describing "core knowledge of the law" as embodying conventional first year classes).
33. The Multistate Bar Examination tests contracts, torts, constitutional law, criminal law and
procedure, evidence, and real property. THE MULTISTATE BAR EXAMINATION, http://www.ncbex.org/
multistate-tests/mbe/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2012).
34. Daniel R. Hansen, Do We Need the Bar Examination?A CriticalEvaluation of the Justifications for the Bar Examination and ProposedAlternatives, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1191 (1995).
35. For an exhaustive history and overview of specialization, see Ariens, supra note 10, at 1043.
36. The influential ABA report on legal education, usually called the "MacCrate Report," discusses how "changing law and new complexities have put an increasing premium on specialization to
maintain competence and keep abreast of subject matter." TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHS. AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM 42 (1992). Some argue that the trend is a positive development because it lowers
the cost of legal services and helps insure greater competence. See Ariens, supra note 10, at 1051-57.
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Llewellyn's Crucial Insight: "Specialization Breeds
Counter-Specialization"

Karl Llewellyn was and remains an influential figure in jurisprudence
and legal education.37 Among his many works, he wrote a remarkable article entitled "The Bar Specializes: With What Results?"3 8 in 1933-almost
precisely the midway point between Lincoln's time and ours. In it Llewellyn notes that the Bar has become increasingly specialized3 9 and the new
specialization is in contrast to what Llewellyn calls the "tolerable roundedness" of the "old-fashioned American lawyer."4 0 Llewellyn offers a crucial
insight that goes deeper than these more conventional observations: "specialization breeds counter-specialization."41

In three words Llewellyn articulates how specialists are not merely discrete, independent islands of expertise. Rather, one area of specialization
triggers an opposing specialization. There is, thus, not only an overarching
specialization in "personal injury." Rather, there is specialization on behalf of personal injury plaintiffs and a "counter-specialization" on behalf of
personal injury defendants. This is far deeper than decrying specialization
as a general matter in contrast to the generalist ideal.4 2 It means that specialization is a process that recalls Newton's Third Law of Motion: for
every action there is an equal and opposite reaction.
B.

Llewellyn's Insight Extended: Good Versus Evil

Llewellyn's "counter-specialization" idea generates an important result: the opposition he identifies is one of good against evil. One group of
specialist-practitioners will argue that its opponents are not motivated by
the public good or by the norms of professionalism and integrity, but by
pecuniary interests, self-aggrandizement, or some general sense of self-interest and "badness."43 Put another way, professional identity becomes
merged into "the interests of particular classes of clients" who are good
against another particular class of clients who are bad."
37. Llewellyn was
CAN LEGAL REALISM 49
One of his books-THE
the law and its study in

a chief exponent of the important movement called "Legal Realism." AMERI(William M. Fisher III et al. eds., 1993). His work is still frequently reprinted.
BRAMBLE BUSH-has been called "one of the most popular introductions to
the United States." Steve Sheppard, Introduction to KARL LLWELLYN, THE

BRAMBLE BUSH, at ix (Steve Sheppard ed. 2008).

38. Karl Llewellyn, The Bar Specializes-With What Results?, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc.
Sci. 177 (1933).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 182.
41. Id. at 183 (emphasis added).
42. It is worth noting that, as with many evocations of the "good old days," the old days might
not have been so good, or at least so different, as current days. See Galanter, supra note 9, at 549
(arguing that a Golden Age argument "emerges not from independent examination of the past but
from the polemical thrust of a critique of the present").
43. I will explore the mechanisms of how this operates in much more detail in the areas of personal injury and criminal law. See infra text accompanying notes 66-141.
44. Carl M. Selinger, The Public's Interest in Preservingthe Dignity and Unity of the Legal Profession, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 861, 870 (1997).
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Social scientists offer an explanation about why this process gets underway and becomes so intractable and enduring. Humans self-identify
with distinct groups which, by definition, are different from other groups.4 5
Group identification can be across a dizzying number of categories even
apart from perhaps the most prominent distinctions based on race, gender,
religion, ethnicity, and sexual orientation. It can, for example, be based on
socioeconomics, geography (whether by continent, country, region, county,
city, neighborhood, block), politics, sports, employment, self-presentation
(clothing, grooming), level of education, age, and many more. Some of
these categories might be a core element of group-identity, or can become
prominent in certain places and times. 4 6 Moreover, these self-identified
groups have a cognitive basis and are deeply rooted in our psyches4 7 and,
once formed, are notoriously difficult to eradicate. They become part of
the cognitive "map" through which we make sense of the world.4 8
Integral to these group identities is the idea that one group-almost
always one's in-group-is "good" while the out-group is "bad." 49 Groups
distinguish and diminish opposing groups-what Cass Sunstein has called
"group polarization.""o Yankee fans "hate" the Red Sox and vice versa,
45. For a recent and fascinating study of how quickly and seamlessly humans form into "tribes"
even based on arbitrary criteria, see Daniel L. Shapiro, Relational Identity Theory: A Systematic Approach for Transforming the Emotional Dimension of Conflict, 65 AMER. PSYCH. 634 (2010). In Shapiro's experiment, a group of participants were randomly selected to sit at different tables. An alien
then entered the room who said the world would be destroyed unless the "tribes" chose "one tribe as
the the tribe for anyone." Id. Despite the obvious interest for all concerned in reaching consensus on
this representative tribe, the ensuing discussion descended into anger and recrimination. The tribes
could reach no agreement." Id. at 634-35.
46. The notion of multiple identifications, or what is sometimes called "intersectionality," tends
to be submerged and simplified in discourse that emphasizes one-group identification. Consider Stanley Fish's amusingly detailed list of groups to which he belongs: "I am, among other things, white, male,
a teacher, a literary critic, a student of interpretation, a member of a law faculty, a father, a son, a
husband (twice), a citizen, a (passionate) consumer, a member of the middle class, a Jew, the oldest of
four children, a cousin, a brother-in-law, a son-in-law, a Democrat, short, balding, fifty, an easterner
who has been a westerner and is now a southerner, a voter, a neighbor, an optimist, a department
chairman." STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY 30 (1989). See also Wayne C. Booth,
Introduction to Mikhail Bakhtin, in PROBLEMS WITH DOSTOYEVSKY's POETICs (Caryl Emerson ed. &

trans. 1984), at xxi (describing Bakthin's idea about how meaning is constructed around the "immense
pluralities of experience" based on, among other things, "parent, clan, class, religion, country").
47. Charles Stangor & James E. Lange, Mental Representations of Social Groups: Advances in
UnderstandingStereotypes and Stereotyping, in 26 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

357 (1994); C. Neil Macrae et al., Stereotypes as Energy-Saving Devices: A Peek Inside the Cognitive
Toolbox, 66 J. PERS. & Soc. PSYCH. 37-38 (1994).

48. See Macrae, supra note 47 ("for reasons of cognitive economy, we categorize others as members of particular groups-groups about which we often have a great deal of generalized, or stereotypic.
knowledge") (quoting S.T. Fiske & S.L. Neubert, A Continuum Model of Impression formation from
Category-Based To Individuating Processes: Influences of Information and Motivation on Attention and
Interpretation,in ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 15 (M.P. Zanna, ed. 1990).

49. Cass Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go To Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 74, 91
(2000) (describing group polarization in light of "the introduction of a rival 'outgroup' "). For a similar
description in the context of cognitive science, see ZOLTAN KOVESCES, LANGUAGE, MIND, AND CUL-

TURE 109-10 (2006) ("prejudices come in the form of structured opposites that correspond to relative
in-groups and out-groups").
50. Sunstein, supra note 49. at 74. Although in the context of discussing deliberative democracy,
Sunstein offers a rich discussion of the psychological and sociological processes that lead group members to adopt increasingly extreme views.
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and hate must be based on something, and that something must be good
against evil."' The residents of that neighborhood are unsophisticated
(bad), while this neighborhood's residents are caring and look out for each
other (good). "Seniors" might decry "kids these days" as lazy or impudent
or spoiled, while those "kids" might view "seniors" as out of touch, cranky,
or narrow. The French think Americans are unrefined and boorish while
Americans think the French are snobbish and unfriendly. There are deeply
held norms of a binary universe at play here: they "draw[ ] battle lines between the 'sons of light' and the 'sons of darkness.' "52
So how does this process play out in terms of the legal profession?
C.

The Lawyer as Moral Crusaderand Charlatan

Good lawyers fight for the people. Stories of lawyerly courage in the
face of oppression and injustice run deep. They are, preeminently, in the
realm of the civil rights movement. The importance of these events in tracing positive lawyer identity cannot be overstated. There remain powerful
images of the fight for Civil Rights; the ringing rejection of "separate but
equal" in Brown v. Board of Education;54 the image of Atticus Finch in the
film 5 and book5 6 To Kill a Mockingbird. As noted earlier, there is the
compelling image of "honest Abe Lincoln" displaying unwavering integrity." The popularity of shows involving lawyers-particularly in criminal
law-continues unabated,5 and, in these instances, as one commentator
has put it, lawyers "are shown as triumphing through law." 9 These images
together represent the professional ideal in word and deed, struggling, and
ultimately succeeding, in doing the "right thing."
51. The sports analogy is a telling one. Research suggests how even the somewhat arbitrary
nature of sports associations breeds enormous in- and out-group feeling to such an extent that
"[w]hoever you root for represents you." James C. McKinley, Sports Psychology: It Isn't Just a Game:
Clues to Avid Rooting, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2000. Like the Shapiro experiment, supra note 45, there is
also the notion that rooting for sports teams relates "to a primitive time when human beings lived in
small tribes, and warriors fighting to protect tribes were true genetic representatives of their people."
Id.
52. AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 4, at 83-84 (quoting ELAINE PAGELS, THE ORIGINS OF
SATAN 105 (1995)).

53. Perhaps the best-known volume tracing the history of the Civil Rights movement is TAYLOR
(1988).

BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KIND YEARS 1954-1963

54. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
55. To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (Universal Pictures 1962).
56. HARPER LEE, To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (1960).

57. See supra text accompanying notes 14-19.
58. The most prominent is the Law & Order franchise, which has spawned numerous spinoffs
and has been on the air for 20 years as of the date of this writing. Law & Order (Universal Media
Studios). Another famous example is Perry Mason, which was popular both as a television show and in
numerous television movie spinoffs. Perry Mason (CBS Television Network).
59. Marc Galanter, Changing Legal Consciousness in America: The View from the Joke Corpus,
23 CARDozo L. REV. 2223, 2238 (2002) (citing films where "Justice is Done!" and where "lawyers
succeed in vindicating the right").
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In contrast, images of "bad lawyers" abound. Lawyer jokes are acceptable and pervasive, and have generated scholarly attention 6 0 and analysis.61 Among the identified categories of lawyer jokes: "the lawyer as
predator," "lawyers as a destructive force," and "lawyers as laboratory
rats."6 2 Numerous images of unscrupulous, greedy and/or self-aggrandizing lawyers remain embedded in modern popular media.6 3
Professional advocacy as identity draws upon contradictory images of
lawyers and appropriates the positive image for the "in group" while accusing the "out group" of embodying negative stereotypes. A key to success
in this effort is to collapse the "good stereotype" into something that is
viewed not as stereotype at all, but as "reality."6 4 Stereotypes become real,
and, so a group would argue, the group is "really" like the good stereotype
while the out-group is "really" the bad stereotype. There is moral condemnation at the foundation of this discourse.65
IV.

PROFESSIONAL IDENTITY AS ADVOCACY IN

Two

CONTEXTS

Professional identity as advocacy plays out in different areas of law.
My first two examples-personal injury and criminal law-are perhaps the
most prominent instances of this dynamic today.6 6 In both instances my
goal is not to assess who is right and who is wrong. It is, rather to describe
the rhetorical and narrative strategies through which professional advocacy
is undertaken.67
A.

The PersonalInjury Wars

Plaintiffs and defendants in personal injury litigation are in economic
equipoise, albeit perhaps not in an obvious way. The ultimate sources of
60. Marc Galanter has written an entire volume assessing and analyzing the impact of lawyer
jokes. MARc GALANTER, LOWERING THE BAR: LAWYER JOKES AND LEGAL CULTURE (2005). For a
summary of Galanter's findings and ideas, see Galanter, supra note 59.
61. For a website that collects and categorizes lawyer jokes, see Peter Tiersman, Lawyer Jokes:
Truth and Nonsense about the Legal Profession, LAWYER JOKES, http://www.languageandlaw.org/
JOKES.HTM (last visited Apr 7, 2012).
62. Galanter, supra note 59, at 2228, 2230, 2234.
63. See infra text accompanying notes 89-116.
64. Successful work in this regard is very much like success in advocacy more generally. See
Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge: Fact and Law in Comparative Perspective, in LOCAL KNOWLEDGE:
FURTHER ESSAYS ON INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 167, 173 (1983) (noting that successful advocacy
entails a "matching process" between what is said and what is real).
65. Marc R. Stanley, When Bad Companies Happen to Good People, 56 DRAKE L. REv. 517, 529
(2008).
66. Consider, for example, legal malpractice with its opposing camps of lawyers who represent
lawyers sued for malpractice and plaintiffs suing lawyers. See, e.g., Joseph F. Cunningham et al., An
Overlooked Defense to ProfessionalLiability, 43 MD. BAR J. 4, 60-61 (July/Aug. 2010) (referring to how
"[d]isgruntled" plaintiffs "proceed with clever arguments" that demonstrate the "increased ingenuity of
...

their new attorneys").

67. While I have my personal sympathies, I resist "taking sides." This article is about a process,
not an assessment of the substance of that process.
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compensation for lawyers on both sides are large organizations: defendants' lawyers directly through hourly fees and plaintiff's lawyers less directly through contingent fees.68 This means that unlike other areas of
practice-particularly those involving low-income litigants described below 69-there are resources available to both "sides" to not only articulate
their professional identity, but to also communicate that identity. This is a
recipe for intense professional identity as advocacy.
1. The Professional Identity of the Plaintiff's Bar
There are two primary mechanisms through which the plaintiff's bar
engages in group advocacy: advertising and professional organizations.
A crucial element of expressing professional identity of the plaintiff's
bar is through advertising. 70 Ads on billboards, television, buses and subways, yellow pages, and lists of "best attorneys" make the personal injury
bar the most omnipresent segment of the legal profession in America.
While such advertising is designed to attract clients,' it is the content of
how this is done and how it expresses a consistent professional identity that
is of importance here.
Perhaps equally important, if less visible, are the efforts of the American Association for Justice-the primary professional organization that
acts on behalf of the personal injury bar.7 2 The rhetoric employed by this
group is consistent with the image fostered through advertising by the personal injury bar.
a. Fightingfor "You"

Many communications from the personal injury bar note that personal
injury lawyers will "fight for you."" The second person pronoun "you" has
68. Gillian Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the Justice System,
98 MICH. L. REV. 953, 956 (2000).

69. See infra text accompanying notes 142-55.
70. The line of Supreme Court cases establishing First Amendment protection for attorney advertising and tracing the limits of that protection has been of incalculable significance in enabling the
personal injury bar to communicate its message and, thereby, intensifying professional group identity
conflicts. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (recognizing First Amendment protections for attorney advertising); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (establishing that
prohibiting in-person solicitation is constitutional); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S.
626 (1985) (targeted mailing to potential personal injury clients is constitutionally protected); Shapero
v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988) (direct mail solicitation constitutional); Fla. Bar v. Went for It,
Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995) (30 day blackout period for solicitation of potential personal injury clients is
constitutional).
71. It should come as no surprise that this kind of advertising is successful at attracting clients,
although competition among personal injury lawyers remains fierce. Sara Parikh, How the Spider
Catches the Fly: Referral Networks in the Plaintiffs Personal Injury Bar, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 243,
264 (2006). As is so characteristic of discourse about personal injury practice, even the title of this
article offers a not very subtle clue as to where the sympathy of the author lies in the personal injury
wars.
72. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR JUSTICE, http://www.justice.org/cps/rde/xchg/justice/hs.xsl/de-

fault.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2012).
73. There are numerous examples. See Personal Injury Lawyers Can Fight for You, http://
www.sylw.org/personal-injury-lawyers-can-fight-for-you.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2012); LAw OFFICES
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enormous power: the "you" addresses the reader directly. "You" necessarily entails "non-you" or, even more tellingly, a third person - "them."7 4
The "you" also extends to jurors-the epitome of the plain old citizen"and the notion that "tort reformers" do not trust jurors to do the right
thing.76 The power of "fight" is also telling: one doesn't "sue" a powerful
opponent: "you" fight against "them" in the mode of David and Goliath."
b.

"Your Rights"

Often these formulations place the issues at stake in terms of "rights,"
thus situating the "fight" in constitutional terms." Such a "fight" for
"rights" recalls the paradigmatic image of the "good lawyer"-the lawyer
who fights for "civil rights" in the "Civil Rights Movement" sense of the
term.79 Yet even further is how this talk of "rights" and "justice" specifically places such lawsuits as vindicating law. Such cases are in the public
interest-a classic technique of the professional identity wars.so
Perhaps these themes are best summed up by how the well-known organization representing the interests of the personal injury bar-the American Trial Lawyers Association-changed its name in 2007 to the American
Association for Justice." Its self-identified mission is "to promote a fair
and effective justice system." 8 2
c.

The "Other": Powerful Interests

These formulations also link up with the deep-rooted populism long
traceable in American history and American culture: "the people""
http://www.jeffmartinlaw.com/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2012) (an experienced attorney
"will fight for you"); The Leading Top eZines Article Site on the Net, http://www.topezinesarticles.com/
(note
culture-and-society/you-should-find-a-top-maryland-personal-injury-attorney-to-fight-for-you/
the web address itself) (last visited Apr. 11, 2012); THE LAW OFFICES OF JOSEPH J. CARIGLIA, P.C.,
http://www.cariglia.com/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2012) ("we will fight for you, and we fight to win").
74. For an account of the power of the second person pronouns, albeit in an entirely different
context, see DAVID FOSTER WALLACE, A SUPPOSEDLY FUN THING I'LL NEVER Do AGAIN 266-67
(1997) (discussing "the near imperative use of the second person" in cruise ship advertising).
75. Stanley, supra note 65, at 521.
76. Perhaps ironically, a leading text on plaintiff representation in personal injury cases devotes a
substantial amount of time on how to identify jurors who believe in "tort reform" in order to exercise
peremptory challenges so they do not serve on juries. DAVID BALL, DAVID BALL ON DAMAGES 85-87
(3d ed. 2011).
77. The David and Goliath image specifically emerges in some personal injury discourse. See
The David and Goliath History of Our Civil Justice System against Toxic Waste and Environmental
Harm, PANAMA CITY, FLA. INJURY LAWYER BLOG, http://www.personalinjurylawyer.com/feed-iteml
the-david-v-goliath-history-our-civil-justice-system-against-toxic-waste-environme (Sept. 30, 2010).
78. LAW OFFICES OF TOBIN, REITMAN, GREENSTEIN, CARUSO, WIENER, KONRAY, & KESSLER,
P.C., http://www.teamlaw.com/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2012) ("we fight for the rights of injured people").
79. See supra text accompanying notes 53-59.
80. See supra text accompanying note 59.
81. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR JUSTICE, http://www.justice.org/cps/rde/xchg/justice/hs.xsl/default.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2012).
82. Id.
83. See MORGAN & MORGAN, http://www.forthepeople.com/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2012).
OF JEFF MARTIN,
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against the "special interests" and "the rich." 8 4 The American Association
for Justice, for example, is "taking on the most powerful interests."" The
rhetoric can be heated: corporations are "artificial creatures" 86 who, as
noted above, confront a system of "David v. Goliath."8 7 The personal injury lawyer is David with the slingshot and the only chance an ordinary
citizen has to fight the power. One law firm sets up the distinctions quite
neatly: the firm is "dedicated to protecting the people, not the powerful.""
Another formulation is as follows:
Corporations Value Profits Over Safety
We aggressively pursue personal injury and wrongful death
claims on behalf of our clients, seeking to hold corporations
accountable for ignoring safety measures in order to turn a
quick profit. We . . .. tak[e] on powerful interests, including

the oil and gas companies ...89
2. Counterattack: Professional Identity and the "Defense Bar"
The personal injury defense bar primarily consists of firms retained by
insurers and, in the case of large class action toxic tort matters, by departments within law firms. Given that this practice almost exclusively represents organizations, it would not be feasible or effective to market services
to the general public. Moreover, the defense bar faces a substantial challenge in promoting the collective interests of their clients. These firms represent clients who are not easily portrayed in sympathetic terms. After
all, insurance companies and large organizations are hardly well-regarded
in the popular imagination. Nevertheless, the defense bar deploys and
draws upon a set of stories to support its own morality tale of good versus
evil.
a. A Creation Myth
The defense bar has its own organization to articulate its identity and
interests-the Defense Research Institute ("DRI"). Calling itself the
84. For an overview of populist rhetoric in American culture and politics, see MICHAEL KAZIN,
(1995); see also WILLIAM F. HOLMES, AMERICAN

THE POPULIST PERSUASION: AN AMERICAN HISTORY

POPULISM (1994).
85. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR JUSTICE, http://www.justice.org/cps/rde/xchg/justice/hs.xsl/de-

fault.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2012).
86. Stanley, supra note 65, at 517.
87. Id. at 526.
88.

ATLANTA PERSONAL INJURY ATrORNEY, CIVIL RIGHTS, WHISTLEBLOWER LAWYER, http://

www.hornsbylaw.com/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2012); see also Personal Injury Attorneys Stand up for you
Against Powerful Business and Corporate Interests, LAW OFFICES OF PAUL WHITFIELD & ASSOCIATES,

http://www.whitfieldattorney.com/docs/personalinjuryattorneysstandupforyouagainstpowerfulcorporate
interests.pdf (stories about unreasonable positions taken by personal injury defendants with document
titled as stated in the url address).
89.

PHILADELPHIA PERSONAL INJURY ATrORNEY, http://www.mswattorneys.com/

Apr. 7, 2012).

(last visited
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"voice of the defense bar," 0 DRI is explicit in articulating its role as filling
a "need for a voice to counter plaintiff's attorneys."" Consider the following story told by DRI about its origins-a creation myth, if you will:
While defense attorneys continued to handle the defense of
individual claims in a traditional, time-proven manner,
plaintiffs' lawyers began to use new tactics and fashion
novel arguments to boost the amount of awards . . . Black-

board arguments and other hitherto unknown courtroom
tactics were inflating the damages for "pain and suffering"
to astronomical amounts. Contingent fees grew disproportionately, and legal liability was being extended beyond the
bounds of reason. On the legislative front, plaintiffs' representatives began to appear before legislative committees to
seek expanded liability while opposing any sort of reform in
the personal injury law.92
The story continues that "[d]efense lawyers recognized the growing
danger and the harmful impact that excessive awards would have on the
civil justice system," hence the need to "unite the defense effort" through
the founding of DRI.
This story is a history by a professional in-group about the rise of a
"bad" out-group, which, in turn, prompts the need for the in-group-the
white hats-to counter the social ill generated by the greed of the outgroup. 9 4 Note that the history is driven by "plaintiffs' lawyers" and "plaintiffs' representatives": the players in this narrative are clearly one lawyer
group against another lawyer group. Also note that in a remarkable parallel with the discourse of the plaintiffs' bar, it is law, the very "civil justice
system" itself-that is at stake and on whose behalf the defense bar is
struggling to vindicate against the forces of evil.
This story demonstrates professional identity as advocacy. Nevertheless, the story only suggests the more powerful story that is at the core of
the defense bar's identity advocacy: the "litigation explosion."

90. DRI, http://www.dri.org/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2012).
91. A History of DRI, DRI 1 (2005), http://www.dri.org/ContentDirectory/Public/About/DRIHistory2005.pdf.
92. Id. It is noteworthy that this narrative also hearkens to an earlier time-a "traditional, time
proven" way of lawyering-thus contrasting the trouble caused by personal injury lawyers with the
ideal of Abraham Lincoln and Atticus Finch. See supra text accompanying notes 14-19, 55-59.
93. Id. at 1-3.
94. There are also remarkable instances of attempting more explicitly to appropriate the stock
figure of the "good lawyer" in terms I have already discussed. See supra text accompanying notes
53-65. One example is an explicit comparison of a President of DRI to Atticus Finch-the embodiment of integrity in the face of injustice. Steven T. Taylor, Dallas Lawyer with Atticus Finch-Like
Attributes Leads the "Voice of the Defense Bar", 27 OF COUNSEL 7 (2008).
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The "Litigation Explosion"

A central image in the personal injury discourse is that America is
being overrun by a "litigation explosion."95 What is remarkable is that this
notion is contradicted by empirical studies of judicial dockets, which consistently show that the area of litigation growing most rapidly is commercial
litigation. 96 Indeed, sometimes the "litigation explosion" is accepted as a
given, thus warranting no or minimal independent support. 97
Perhaps the key to how the litigation explosion is articulated and understood is through anecdotes of laughable overreaching by the plaintiffs'
bar. Such anecdotes carry enormous rhetorical power. 98 The following discussion surveys a few of the more striking stories of this type.
i. Of Seesaws and Childhood Obesity
Life Without Lawyers: LiberatingAmericans from Too Much Law by

Philip K. Howard99 is a recent book ostensibly devoted to how, as its name
suggests, law and laws are ruining the country. In the book and in interviews, it is clear that Howard, despite the broadly framed title, does not
mean "too much law" and "lawyers" in the general sense; rather, he is referring only to tort law and personal injury lawyers. 00 In making his argument, Howard employs a series of "ghastly anecdotes."o' One involves
the looming threat of seesaw litigation: "If any child who falls on a seesaw
can sue, all seesaws will be removed from playgrounds," which "results in
the consistent removal of school playgrounds, which leads to the larger
95. Michael D. Johnston, The Litigation Explosion, Proposed Reforms, and Their Consequences,
21 BYU J. Pun. L.179, 180 (2007); David Neubaer & Stephen S. Meinhold, Too Quick to Sue? Public
Perceptionsof the Litigation Explosion, 16 JusT. Sys. J. 1 (1994).
96. See EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, 2002: A NATIONAL PERSPECfIlVE FROM THE
COURT STATISTICS PioJicr 23-24 (Brian J. Ostrom et al. eds., 2003) (noting that tort filings decreased
in 30 states surveyed); Marc Galanter, The Life and Times of the Big Six: Or, the Federal Courts Since
the Good Old Days, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 945 (the largest increase in civil federal court findings is in
commercial litigation).
97. See, e.g., Johnston, supra note 95, at 180 (arguing that there is "substantial evidence of a
'litigation explosion' that is consuming the productivity, profits, and general effectiveness of many
American industries" while noting in a footnote that "the seriousness of the problem is hotly
disputed").
98. An element of this power is how crucial-if not essential-narratives are in understanding
experience and "reality." For an example in the context of the development of law, see AN-1-1ONY G.
AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAw 114-15 (2000) ("[k]nowing how to tell [stories]
and to comprehend them may be part of our human survival kit"). Perhaps the seminal article on the
role of narrative in legal discourse is Robert Cover, The Supreme Courts, 1982 Term-Forward:Nomos

and Narrative, 97 HARv. L. REv. 4 (1983). For other excellent discussions of narrative and the law, see
Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon between Legal Power and NarrativeMeaning,
87 MICH. L. REV. 2225 (1989). For a more general non-legal treatment, see Louis 0. MINK, NARRATivE FORM AS A COGNITIVE INSTRUMENT, IN The Writing of History: Literary Form and Historical
Understanding 129-49 (Robert H. Canary & Henry Kozicki, eds. 1978); Hayden White, The Value of
Narrativity in the Representation of Reality, 7 CRITICAL INQUIRY 5 (1980).
99. Pimi K. HOWARi, LIFE WYnIIOUT LAWYERS: LIBERATING AMERICANS FROM Too MUCH
LAw (2009).
100. See generally id.
101. Non Fiction Review: Life without Lawyers: Liberating Americans from Too Much Law, PulLISIER'S WEEKLY, http://www.publishersweekly.com/978-0-393-06566-4 (last visited Apr. 7, 2012).
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problem of childhood obesity."1 02 Rhetorically, the statement is a string
not only of possibilities but also of inevitabilities: all falls from seesaws will
generate lawsuits; all seesaws will be removed from playgrounds; the lack
of seesaws will cause childhood obesity. While logicians would find this
reasoning dubious at best, the argument demonstrates elements typical of
professional identity rhetoric: a ridiculous example of litigation (seesaw
cases) and how this type of litigation generates social harm which is not in
the public interest. In this instance, the choice of the ridiculous suit is particularly compelling: innocent playground equipment-the stuff of childhood innocence-is being taken away, which not only eliminates fun, but
exacerbates a well-publicized and intensifying public health threat to children."o This is an image of a personal injury lawyer not only as a killjoy,
but as, quite literally, guilty of child endangerment.
It is also notable that Howard is a large firm partner 0 4-a theme to be
explored later in the Article.
ii. Of McDonald's and Million Dollar Pants
The famous case of a massive award for spilled McDonald's coffee10 5
triggered satire in SeinfeldlO6 and is so embedded in the American psyche
that a book on personal injury advocacy offers advice on voir dire of jurors
should the McDonald's Coffee case crop up.'0o While some have sought to
correct the ridiculous image with the seriousness of what "really happened,"' which is far more sympathetic than the myth suggests, the power
of the story remains.
102. Rachel M. Zahorsky, Now is the Time for 'Life Without Lawyers,' Says Covington & Burling
Partner, ABA J. DAIuY, http://www.abajournal.com/news/now.is-the-time forlifewithout_1awyers
says covington-burling-partner (last visited Apr. 7, 2012).
103. In 2010 alone, at least three books have been published regarding this issue. ROlERT A.
PaErwW, OVERWEIGHT: WHIATr KIDs SAY: WHAT'S REALLY CAUSING THE CHILDHOOD OnEscry Ev)Mnc (2010); PREVENTING CHILDHOOD OBESIfY: EVIDENCE PoIcY AND PRACIlCE (Elizabeth Waters et al., eds.) (2010); JENNIFER A. O'DEA, CILHOOD OBESITY PREVENTION: INTERNATIONAL
RESEARCH, CONTROVERSIES, AND) INTERVENTIONs (2010). The Center for Disease Control considers

the problem significant enough to devote a separate section of its website to it. Obesity and Overweight, TinE CENTER FoR DISEASE CORMROL, http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/childhoodlindex.html (last
visited Apr. 7, 2012).
104. Howard is a partner at Covington and Burling. Zahorsky, supra note 102.
105. Only an order, not an opinion, was issued in the case. Liebeck v. McDonald's Restaurants,
P.T.S., Inc., No. CV-93-02419, 1995 WL 360309 (Bernalillo County, N.M. Dist. Ct. Aug. 18, 1994).
106. Mark B. Greenlee, Kramer v. Java World: Images, Issues, and Idols in the Debate over Tort
Reform, 26 CAP. U.L. REV. 701 (1997). Greenlee describes the episode, along with quotes from the
dialogue, in detail. Id. at 704-09.
107. BALL, supra note 76, at 87. Ball's advice is for attorneys not to convince prospective jurors
whether the verdict was fair or not, but, rather, "do nothing but ask questions about it" and "take no
sides." Evidently the issue of "spilled beverage" liability has become serious enough to warrant a separate American Law Reports entry. Michelle C. Kaminsky, Liability for Vendor for Food or Beverage
Spilled on Customer, 64 A.L.R. 5th (1998).
108. Such efforts have been published in both law reviews and in bar journals. Kevin G. Cain,
And Now the Rest of the Story .. . : The McDonald's Coffee Lawsuit, 11 J. CONSUMER & COM. L. 14
(2007); Greenlee, supra note 106; Steven A. Meyer, Too Bad to Be True, 28 PA. LAw 43, 44 (2006) (the
subtitle of the article is "[w]hen someone tells a story about an outrageous jury decision, check it out:
Odds are it may never have happened").
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And then there is the story of how, as a New York Times article put it,
a "Judge Tries Suing Pants Off Dry Cleaners.""0 ' In this instance, an administrative law judge sued a neighborhood dry cleaner for $67.3 million
for misplacing his pants. 0 While not as pervasive as the McDonald's case,
the story of the judge and his pants still became "a worldwide symbol of
legal abuse by seeking jackpot justice'"-a preposterous circumstance assumed to be representative of litigation.
In the rhetoric of professional identity, the underlying validity of these
stories as both true and representative are accepted without question.
They both establish and reinforce stories of frivolous lawsuits, greed, and
overreaching-the defining characteristics of the "litigation explosion"
and, by extension, what the plaintiffs' bar is all about.
3. Battle Is Joined
In response to the McDonald's Coffee tale, the personal injury bar
decries "those who concoct mythical lawsuit anecdotes" and "generalize
from the occasional aberrant case."" 2 Moreover, as noted above," 3 the
term "trial lawyers" itself has become such an epithet in political discourse
that the most prominent association of personal injury attorneys recently
changed its name from the "American Association of Trial Attorneys" to
the "American Association for Justice"" 4-a telling attempt to seize the
moral high ground in the push/pull of professional advocacy. Indeed, there
is a deep political and ideological dimension to this debate, with "liberal"
trial lawyers wary of free market capitalism"' and "conservative" political
leaders arguing in favor of "tort reform." 116
In the end, what is striking is how the debate focuses on lawyers themselves and their rhetoric as a "group," with each group excoriating the motives and social impact of the professional activities of the other group.
B.

Criminal Justice

As the center of law and the popular imagination, criminal defense
attorneys and prosecutors assume mythical roles of good against evil, both
109. Ariel Sabar & Suevon Lee, Judge Tries Suing Pants off Dry Cleaners, N.Y. TIMES, June 13,
2007, at A13.
110. Id. For the denouement, see Ariel Sabar, In Case of Missing Trousers,Aggrieved Party Loses
Again, N.Y. TIMi~s, June 26, 2007 (the trial court found that "that the plaintiff is not entitled to any
relief whatsoever").
111. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, CAFA's Impact on Litigation as a Public Good, 29 CARI)ozo L.
Ri-v. 2517, 2525 (2008) (quoting Lubna Takuri, Judge Rules in Favor of Dry Cleanerin $54M Suit Over
Missing Pants, LAw.com (June 26, 2007), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1182762359671).
112. Stanley, supra note 65, at 519.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 81-82.
114. Stanley, supra note 65, at 518.
115. Id. (in the context of defending personal injury lawsuits, offering a "contrary view" to the
notion "that the free market regulates itself").
116. Litigation and Professional Responsibility: Is Overlawyering Overtaking Democracy?, 21
GEzo. J. LEGAL Eriucs 1433 (2008) (transcript of panel). This political divide should not be simplified,
however, as some conservative Christian groups argue against tort reform. Stanley, supra note 65, at
529.
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seeking to bear the mantle of truth and justice. There are, of course, inherent differences in these roles in the special context of criminal law: prosecutors frame their role as pursuing justice to victims and preserving safety and
the rule of law to society at large, while defense attorneys, classically, frame
their role as preserving individual rights.' At least from a broad perspective, however, both claims are legitimate, and, after all, the entire process is
called the criminal justice system. Identity advocacy, however, shifts the
emphasis from system to good and bad actors within the system.
1. Overreaching Prosecutors: Political Ambition and Ego
It is a deep seated notion that the prosecution function "is to seek
justice, not merely to convict."'
In the negative discourse about prosecutors, however, this is the goal that is honored in the breach. An extensive
literature excoriates the "scorekeeping mentality" of prosecutors: they
(that is, prosecutors as a group) promote convictions over justice" 9 by
withholding exculpatory evidence tending to show the innocence of criminal defendants.' 2 0 There is the pervasive image of the politically ambitious
prosecutor whose goal is to secure high profile convictions in order to promote reelection or higher office.12 ' Indeed, the rapacious, unethical, politically motivated prosecutor is a longstanding stock character in American
popular culture. 22 Prosecutors also "flex their muscles in the courtroom
solely for the purpose of posturing in front of the jury."1 23
117. See Kalthleen P. Browe, A Critiqueof the Civility Movement: Why Rambo Will not Go Away,
77 MARQ. L. REV. 751, 766 (1994) ("prosecuting attorneys see themselves as protectors of justice, and
criminal defense attorneys see themselves as defenders of individual rights").
118. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE PROSECUTOR FUNCTION Standard 31.2(c). The ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr similarly note that a "prosecutor has the

responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate." R. 3.8 cmt. This notion is
embedded in Supreme Court jurisprudence as well. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)
(government's interest "in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be
done"). See also Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice"?, 26 FORDHAM L.J. 607
(1999); R. Michael Cassidy, Characterand Context: What Virtue Theory Can Teach Us about a Prosecutor's Ethical Duty To "Seek Justice", 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 635 (2006).

119. See, e.g., Catherine Ferguson-Gilbert, It Is Not Whether You Win or Lose, It is How You Play
the Game: Is the Win-Loss Scorekeeping Mentality Doing Justice for Prosecutors?,38 CAL. W. L. REV.
283 (2001); Kenneth Bresler, "I Never Lost a Trial": When Prosecutors Keep Score of Criminal Convictions, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 537 (1996). For a response to Bresler's article, see Thomas Hagemann,
Confessions from a Scorekeeper: A Reply to Mr. Bresler, 10 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 151 (1996).
120. Alafair S. Burke, Talking about Prosecutors, 31 CARDOzo L. REV. 2119, 2119 (2010)
(describing prosecutors who "withhold exculpatory evidence that might undermine their impressive
conviction rates").
121. Sandra Caron George, ProsecutorialDiscretion: What's Politics Got To Do With It?, 18 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 739 (2005); Kenneth Bresler, Seeking Justice, Seeking Election, and Seeking the Death
Penalty: The Ethics of ProsecutorialCandidates' Campaigning on CapitalCases, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 941 (1994).
122. THEY WON'T FORGET (NYT 1937) (features Claude Reins in a "savage characterization of

the ambitious prosecutor"). PRINCE OF THE CITY (New York Magazine 1981) (involves a plot involving
"new, politically ambitious prosecutors, hungry for blood-anyone's blood").
123. Cassidy, supra note 118, at 672; Burke, supra note 120, at 2119 (describing literature that
portrays prosecutors as "mak[ing] prejudicial and misleading statements to both judgments and
juries").
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Consider the following indictment of prosecutors by a criminal defense
attorney:
The prosecution is not content just to use superior resources
against defendants. They are in hot pursuit of defense lawyers, especially those that are highly skilled with reputations
to match. Some prosecutors want civil, criminal and disciplinary immunity for their actions. They seek to further
their reputations by trapping, prosecuting, or obtaining disciplinary sanctions against defense lawyers. In some cases
they are found to go overboard in their zeal, they want immunity and their own Code of Ethics whose violations, if
any, they shall determine . . . [W]e will be creating a special
class of impervious prosecutors, unchecked in whatever violations of the Constitution and law that they may
commit." 124
Another example, this time from the academic literature:
[A]s the courts continue to recognize new rights of criminal
defendants, prosecutors continue to devise new and improper ways to impair the exercise of those rights ... Prosecutors have found new ways to subvert the rules of evidence
and to introduce inadmissible evidence indirectly under the
guise of some feigned legitimate purpose. Prosecutors also
have created charades to mask deals with cooperating witnesses in order to prevent exposure of the agreement
through cross-examination. Prosecutors have devised other
schemes and tactics to prevent the accused from gaining access to exculpatory evidence. Prosecutors have also used
their control of experts to introduce outlandish opinions,
distort the facts, and mislead the jury.125
Here are the telltale signs of identity advocacy: the branding of the
"other" professional group collectively (albeit with a single nod to "some"
of the out group) as selfish, self-interested, promoting reputations with
monumental consequences. They run amok, violating constitutional rights.
There is an assumption that these instances are common, even the norm
among prosecutors. As one commentator characterizes it, there is a "prevailing rhetoric of fault" in discourse about prosecutors. 2 6
124. Thomas F. Liotti, The Uneven Playing Field: Ethical Disparitiesbetween the Prosecution and
Defense Functions in Criminal Cases, 17 ToURo L. REV. 467, 501 (2001).
125. Bennett L. Gershman, "Hard Strikes and Foul Blows": Berger v. United States 75 Years After,
42 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 177, 204-205 (2010).
126. Burke, supra note 120, at 2127. Burke relates a brief story to prove this point at the beginning of his article: After seeing a "former law school ethics professor for the first time in fifteen years
. . . "I had barely gotten out the initial words-I was a prosecutor-before hearing her response: Morally compromised, were you?" Id. at 2119.
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Moreover, there are highly publicized instances of prosecutorial overreach.127 At the national level, the Duke Lacrosse case, involving accusations of rape and ensuing revelations about prosecutor Michael D. Nifong's
handling of the case, captured the public imagination. 128 After Nifong pursued indictments of three Duke Lacrosse players for rape, with Nifong
making multiple statements to the media about the case, all charges against
the three were dismissed. As the matter unfolded and as more information
about the case emerged, Nifong became the embodiment of the overreaching prosecutor, evidently with quite a bit of justification. This image has
appeared in scholarship,'12 9 in ensuing investigations by the Attorney General of North Carolina,' 3 0 and, ultimately, in proceedings that led to
Nifong's disbarment by the North Carolina Bar.1 3 1 Not surprisingly, the
defense counsel in the case "repeatedly said Nifong pursued the case for

political gain." 132
Although by no means reaching the same national level of public scrutiny as the Duke Lacrosse case, other cases of more local interest also involve prosecutors who fit the stereotype of the ambitious prosecutor.13 3
2.

Returning the Favor: How Can You Defend Those People?

Prosecutors inhabit unique territory in identity advocacy. On the one
hand, they operate under specific ethical restrictions' 3 4-albeit fuzzy-as
to what they can or cannot say, the boundaries of which are, ultimately, of
127. For a detailed discussion of examples, see Laurie L. Levenson, ProsecutorialSounds Bites:
When Do They Cross the Line?, 44 GA. L. REV. 1021, 1038-51 (2010) (citing examples of improper
statements by prosecutors regarding a defendant's "character and race," a defendant's "admissions or
confessions," the legitimacy of DNA and scientific tests, and the creditability of witness credibility). See
also Sarah K. Fleisch, The Ethics of Legal Commentary: A Reconsiderationof the Need for an Ethical
Code in Light of the Duke Lacrosse Matter, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL Ermcs 599 (2007).
128. See Duke Lacrosse Sexual Assault Case News, N.Y. TIMES http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/
reference/timestopics/organizations/d/duke-university/duke_1acrosse sexualassault-case/index.html
(last visited Apr. 7, 2012) (tracing coverage of the case in the New York Times).
129. See, e.g., R. Taylor Matthews, The Duke Lacrosse Rape Case: A Public Branding, Is There a
Remedy?, 52 ST. Louis U. L.J. 669 (2008); Robert P. Mosteller, The Duke Lacrosse Case, Innocence,
and False Identifications:A Fundamental Failure to "Do Justice", 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1337 (2007).
130. The ensuing investigation of the matter by the North Carolina Attorney General Roy A.
Cooper concluded that Nifong was "unchecked," "overreaching," and a "rogue prosecutor." Duff Wilson & David Barstow, All Charges Dropped in Duke Case, N.Y. TIMEs, (April 12, 2007), http://
www.nytimes.com/2007/04/12/us/12duke.html.
131. See Robert P. Mosteller, Exculpatory Evidence, Ethics, and the Road to the Disbarment of
Mike Nifong: The CriticalImportance of Full Open-File Discovery, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 257 (2008).
132. Defense Attorneys: Rush to Prove Guilt in Duke Lacrosse Case, WRAL.com http://
www.wral.com/news/local/story/1617292/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2012).
133. For a recent example, see in re Russell, 797 N.W.2d 77 (S.D. 2011) (finding of unethical
conduct by a prosecutor, who subsequently became a state legislator, for publicizing a Grand Jury
transcript to counter criticism in his handling of a politically charged case).
134. The most prominent guideline is in MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 3.8, which prohib-

its prosecutors from "making extrajudicial comments that have a substantial likelihood of heightening
public condemnation of the accused." The Rule goes on to mandate that a prosecutor "exercise reasonable care to prevent investigators, law enforcement personnel, employees or other persons assisting or
associated with the prosecutor" from making such comments. Id.
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constitutional dimension.13 5 For example, ethical guidelines prohibit prosecutors from making public statements that "heighten[ ] public condemnation of the accused."' 3 6 While the specificity and enforcement of such
standards, as noted above, have been criticized,"3 they furnish at least
some limitation on openly criticizing defense counsel.
On the other hand, prosecutors enjoy an inherent advantage in the
identity advocacy wars. Prosecutors pursue justice by seeking to punish
accused criminals, and, thus, a prosecutor's morality is embedded in the
criminal process itself. There is little need to criticize the morality of defense counsel when their clients are accused of often brutal and reprehensible crimes for which, as the assumption goes, they are guilty.' 38 Public
condemnation of accused rapists or murderers is pretty much a given without effort on the part prosecutors, and, by extension, those who defend the
rapists and murderers are the enemy of truth and justice. As a result, identity advocacy for prosecutors, in many respects, takes care of itself.
Given these realities, much of the rhetoric in favor of the professional
identity of prosecutors is less explicit and more subtle than that of the criminal defense bar. For example, the preeminent national organization for
state prosecutors-the National District Attorneys Association-characterizes itself as "the voice of America's prosecutors . . . in their efforts to

protect the rights and safety of the people."'" 9 There is nothing here that is
directly critical of the defense bar. There is, however, an inherent critique
of the defense counsel insofar as it is the criminal justice system-defense
counsel included-that pursues justice, not just the "efforts" of prosecutors. This organization, however, omits defense counsel from this effort,
thus transforming an integrated system into one in which only one element
of the system-prosecutors-are on the side of the "rights and safety of the
people." Indeed, the seemingly moral high ground enjoyed by prosecutors
does appear in strident form in popular discourse. This anti-defense counsel discourse is embodied in the oft-asked question, and the title of one
recent book 40 and yet another book:141 "How Can You Defend Those
People?"

135. The leading case is Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1033 (1991) (seeking to balance prosecutor's First Amendment rights with the constitutional concerns about a "substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding").
136. MODEL RULES, supra note 21.
137. See generally Levenson, supra note 127.
138. It is notable that these spectacular instances of brutality are only a small subset of criminal
cases, the vast majority of which involve matters, such as drug possession, that typically garner attention
only in the aggregate or when celebrities are involved.
139. NATIONAL DISTRICr ATORNEYS

ASSOCIATION, http:www.ndaa.org (last visited Apr. 7,

2012).
140. MICKEY SHERMAN, How CAN You DEFEND THOSE PEOPLE? (2008).
141. JAMES S. KUNIN, "How CAN You DEFEND THOSE PEOPLE": THE MAKING OF A CRIMINAL
DEFENSE LAWYER (1983). The phrase also crops up in other contexts. See, e.g., Barbara Allen Bab-

cock, The Duty to Defend, 114 YALE L.J. 1489, 1515 (2005).
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WALL STREET LAWYERS

To the "man on the street," being a lawyer is usually about being a
criminal lawyer or a personal injury lawyer. There is virtually no attention
paid to a wide swath of the profession whose identity does not involve repeated opposition to "counter-specialists." Such lawyers include the trusts
and estates lawyer, the real estate lawyer, the lawyer who counsels small
businesses, the lawyer who engages in a little bit of this and a little bit of
that-that is, the many lawyers who, with little or no fanfare, engage in
non-contingent fee work on behalf of, typically, middle class clients.
However, two particularly significant segments of legal services tend to
operate under the radar screen. These are lawyers engaged in an extraordinarily large amount of litigation involving low-income litigants and largescale commercial litigation. In the first case, there is professional identity
as advocacy, but the nature of work, based on a number of reasons I will
trace below, generate an ironic result: no one is listening. In the second
case, there is no professional identity as advocacy; there is, rather, professional identity as proxy for status. The whys and wherefores of these two
situations are interesting case studies of how professional identity advocacy
has an impact even in contexts in which it does not exist.
A.

Professional Identity in Search of an Audience:
Advocacy on Behalf of Low-Income Clients

As I have traced in detail elsewhere,1 42 there is a massive adjudicatory
system that operates below the level of attention of most observers, including most lawyers and the culture at large. This is the representation of
individual low-income clients.
These cases fall into distinct categories. First, there are landlord-tenant matters, adjudicated in an array of fora that are both overwhelmed with
cases and overwhelmingly under-resourced.1 4 3 Second, there are cases involving claims for government benefits primarily adjudicated in a patchwork of state and federal administrative agencies.144 Third, there are
family law cases often involving child custody. 14 5
Few lawyers represent litigants in these cases. In contrast to personal
injury practice, where the defendant's resources fund the representation,'14 6
in these cases there is no opportunity to make a profit because the clients,
by definition, have little or no resources. Thus, those with fundamental
142. Robert Rubinson, A Theory of Access to Justice, 29 J. LEGAL. PROF. 89 (2004-2005).
143. For descriptions of such landlord-tenant courts, see Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court:
Participationand Subordination of Poor Tenants' Voices in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 533
(1992); Rubinson, supra note 142, at 108-109; Russell Engler, And Justicefor All-Including the Unrepresented Poor: Revising the Role of Judges, Mediators,and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987, 2057-63
(1999) (describing Boston's "Housing Court"); A System in Collapse, Abell Rep., Mar. 2003, at 1.5.
144. Rubinson, supra note 142, at 109-12.
145. Jane C. Murphy, Access to Legal Remedies: The Crisis in Family Law, 8 BYU J. PuB. L.
123-24 (1993).
146. See supra text accompanying notes 68-69.
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interests at issue-food, shelter, custody of children-are least able to obtain legal services and almost invariably receive minimal process in litigat-

ing their matters.14 7
In terms of professional identity as advocacy, there is an immediate
distinction between these matters and personal injury and criminal justice:
the number of lawyers engaged in this work is miniscule.' There is, however, a corps of lawyers who do this kind of work: attorneys funded by the
Legal Services Corporation, Legal Aid and Legal Services groups, and
other organizations primarily funded by private foundations and, at times,
governmental subsidies. Nevertheless, with few exceptions discussed below, 14 9 the number of clients in need of legal services far outstrips the supply of lawyers who engage in this work, and the low profile of these
litigants preclude professional identity as advocacy from gaining traction.15 0
Ironically, this is in the teeth of a type of practice that, perhaps, has an
immensely powerful impulse towards professional identity. These lawyers
usually represent low-income clients because of a deep personal belief in
remedying injustice and inequality, even given the rapidly increasing disparity in salaries between those doing this work as compared to those engaged in private practice.'"' Public interest lawyers would like nothing
more than to publicize their identity and those of their clients. There are,
however, virtually no movies, books, news broadcasts, or other means of
popular information that examine the tens of thousands of unrepresented
litigants. The situation is, as one commentator has put it, the functional
equivalent of "silence in the court."152
There are exceptions to this general picture. The long history of controversy surrounding funding the legal services corporation is perhaps the
147. Rubinson, supra note 142.
148. Numerous measures demonstrate this, but perhaps the most powerful has been set forth by
David Luban, who found that about 1% of the $100 billion legal industry is devoted to the needs of
low-income Americans, or, while there is "about 1 lawyer for every 240 nonpoor Americans" there is
"only one lawyer for every 9000 Americans" who would qualify for legal aid. David Luban, Taking Out
the Adversary: The Assault on ProgressivePublic-InterestLawyers, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 209, 211 (2003).
For a classic treatment of the impact of this power differential, see Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves"
Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 1974 LAw. & Soc. 95, 108-09 (noting that
pro se's are "one shot" players facing "repeat players" in litigation, and thus, are subject to "mass
processing with little of the individuated attention of full-dress adjudication").
149. See supra text accompanying note 142.
150. There remain calls for a "Civil Gideon" in order to guarantee representation in civil cases,
but these efforts have not been successful. The Supreme Court has held that "an indigent litigant has a
right to appointed counsel only when, if he loses, he may be deprived of his physical liberty." Lassiter
v. Dep't of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 26-27 (1981). State efforts to recognize a Civil Gideon have
also not fared well. See Lee Shevell, Civil Gideon: The Poor Man's Fight, 16 PuB. INT. L. REV. 32,
34-35 (2010).
151. According to the National Association for Law Placement, as of 2008, the starting salary for
lawyers in civil legal services is $40,000; for firms of 50 or fewer lawyers it is $80,000; for the largest
firms it is $145,000. New Findings on Salaries for Public Interest Attorneys, NALP BULLETIN, http://
www.nalp.org/2008sepnewfindings (last visited Apr. 7, 2012).
152. Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participationand Subordination of Poor Tenants'
Voices in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 533 (1992).
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most prominent example.15 3 Another instance relates to "IOLTA"-"interest on lawyers' trust accounts"-through which interest on client funds
placed in escrow are used to fund legal services. The controversy centers
on whether such funds are clients' "property" and, if so, would using interest generated by these funds for other purposes constitute a constitutionally impermissible "taking"? The Supreme Court has entered the fray in
two casesl 54 that, in the end, leave the constitutionality of IOLTA uncertain
and dependent on circumstances. Both the LSC and IOLTA controversies
are intensely political, hot button issues. 5
Nevertheless, these issues are not joined in remotely the same way as
personal injury law and criminal law. There are too few lawyers and too
little money at stake for it to generate the traction that in terms of publicity
is the lifeblood of professional identity as advocacy.
B.

Professional Identity as Proxy for Status: The Wall Street Lawyer

A second wholly different group, and equally telling for purposes of
this Article, involves lawyers who practice in large firms that represent
large organizations.
The work of these firms is little known outside the narrow culture of
law schools-mostly elite law schools-and the increasing numbers of large
law firms themselves. For sure one could argue that this largely invisible
yet huge area of practice generates substantial financial impact by multiplying transaction costs for business-costs that find their way into consumer
prices-yet this group maintains its prestige and is virtually never subject
to public scrutiny." Indeed, the book on "Life without Lawyers" discussed
above is about life without personal injury lawyers, not life without large
firm lawyers, with the author being a large firm lawyer himself"'-a telling
example of the point. Moreover, many large firms shy away from offending larger potentials or actual organizational clients, and thus do not take
on, for example, civil rights employment cases or environmental cases.1 58
The increasing importance of this type of practice, however, is undeniable. From 1975 to 2007, American law firms with 200 or more lawyers
153. For a detailed history of the Legal Services Corporation and its predecessors, see Alan W.
Housman, Linda E. Perle, A Brief History of Civil Legal Assistance in the United States (Center for Law
and Public Policy 2007). For regulations that limit the types of cases LSC-funded organizations can
undertake, see 45 C.F.R. § 1612.1 (2010).
154. Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156 (1998); Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538
U.S. 216 (2003).
155. Both IOLTA cases were brought by the Washington Legal Foundation, a group dedicated to
"free enterprise" and the "free enterprise system." WLF MissIoN, http://www.wlf.org/org/mission.asp
(last visited Apr. 7, 2012).
156. Brent J. Horton, How CorporateLawyers Escape Sarbanes-Oxley: DisparateTreatment in the
Legislative Process, 60 S.C. L. REv. 149, 202 (2008).
157. For a description of this book, see supra text accompanying notes 99-104.
158. Scott Cummings, The Politics of Pro Bono, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1, 118-19 (2004). Note this is
in striking contrast to the practice of Abraham Lincoln, who did not shy away from representing Railroad Companies-the preeminent example of corporate power in his time. See supra text accompanying notes 14-18.
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have grown from 4 to 150.159 Fewer and fewer lawyers are representing
individuals.' 6 0 The question then arises of how the idea of professional
identity as advocacy plays out, if at all, in this increasingly importantalbeit largely hidden-context. The answer lies in the prestige accorded
this bar and the commonalities of the clients they represent.
1. The "Elite" as Professional Identity
The stratification of the profession, with the "Wall Street lawyer" at
the top, has been developing for well over a century. As one legal historian
has noted, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, "[m]ost lawyers still
went to court; but the Wall Street lawyer, who perhaps never spoke to a
judge except socially, made more money and had more prestige than any
courtroom lawyer could hope for."161 The career of one prominent lawyer-Thomas L. Chadbourne-typifies the increasing emergence of the
Wall Street lawyer. In 1896, Chadbourne's practice included criminal and
personal injury cases until, as he put it, "[iut finally dawned on me that with
the same thought and energy, we could make much more money by changing our practice and making it more corporate and commercial and less
trial and criminal."1 62 After this realization, he only practiced corporate
law, and the law firm he created-Chadbourne and Parke-remains a major law firm serving corporate clients. 16 3
This stratification is extraordinarily important-probably the single
most important distinction in the profession today.16 4 Unlike Chadbourne's candid descriptions of the reasons for the shift in his practice, the
current rhetoric of the large firm is very different. It stresses the greater
significance and intellectual challenges of representing large organizations;
the crucial importance of graduating from an elite law school (and thus
being "the best and the brightest") 16 5 in order to gain entr6e into large
159. THE LAWYER'S ALMANAC 2007, at Al-A6 (2007).
160. John P. Heinz, et al., URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 29 (2005)
(collecting data demonstrating that 64% of lawyers deliver legal services to large organizations-a percentage that has grown significantly over time).
161. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 483 (3d ed. 2005). See also JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 63-64
(1975) (tracing the rise of affluent, largely "corporate" lawyers from the late nineteenth-century to the
early twentieth-century).
162. Ariens, supra note 10, at 1016-17 (quoting THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THOMAS L. CHADBOURNE 34 (Charles C. Goetsch & Margaret L. Shivers, eds. 1985)).
163. Id.
164. Two commentators have noted as follows: "[M]uch of the differentiation within the legal
profession is secondary to one fundamental distinction-the distinction between lawyers who represent
large organizations (corporations, labor unions, or government), and those who represent individuals."
JOHN P. HEINZ AND EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE
BAR 319 (1982).
165. Even Karl Llewellyn, in his article about the specialization of the bar discussed infra, asserts
that corporate practice attracts the "best brains"-a demonstration of the intellectual hierarchy just as
prevalent in 1933 as it is today. See Llewellyn, supra note 38, at 178-79. Compare, however, the justquoted statement of Thomas L. Chadbourne, who noted that business law took "the same thought and
energy" as trial work-perhaps a candid statement made more possible given how close it was to the
ascendency of the elite business lawyer. See supra text accompanying note 162.

2012]1

PROFESSIONAL IDENTITY AS ADVOCACY

35

firms; the supposed "complexity" of corporate work that requires the services of the "best and the brightest"; equating the large amount of money
at stake in large firm practice with social importance.16 6 Each of these assertions is highly questionable,' 67 but remains the "objective" measure of
the prestige accorded to lawyers who practice in this area.
With few exceptions noted below, however, professional identity as
advocacy does not operate in this context. The most obvious reason why
this is the case is that in classic large business litigation, one large organizational client, represented by a large law firm, is opposed to another large
organizational client, represented by another large law firm. For sure,
within individual cases there are narratives of right and wrong and morality
and immorality, of one side doing "the right thing" and the other side doing "the wrong thing." 168 Larger political and moral stances-professional
identity as advocacy-do not come into play, however, because there are
not opposing categories of clients, such as individual personal injury plaintiffs against large organizations or prosecutors against criminal defendants.
Put another away, the professional identity of opposing law firms in large
firm practice is identical: they work on behalf of large organizations. There
is no differential in power or in justice on behalf of one versus another.
Moreover, while there is a robust sense of gossip among lawyers or law
students who are in or bound for this type of practice, 6 9 the last thing large
firms want is to draw attention to themselves outside this bounded circle.
To do so would be to raise issues of the social and economic impact of their
own practice on business-the issue that is so essential to the accusations
against the personal injury bar. 17 0 This is, perhaps, ironic given that an
increasing number of large firms generate profits in excess of $1 billion," 1
with questions about social value and additional costs to consumers warranting at least some examination. Thus, in the case of large firms, professional identity as advocacy is studiously avoided, not embraced, and it
appears that large firms have largely succeeded in achieving this goal.' 7 2
166. Note the following statement in the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct relating to
competence: "The required attention and preparation are determined in part by what is at stake: major
litigation and complex transactions ordinarily require more extensive treatment than matters of lesser
complexity and consequence." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.1 cmt. [5]. This is a remarkable statement, with the circular reasoning that "complex transactions" are "complex"-reasoning that,
by implication, the more intelligent members of the bar, that is, graduates of elite law schools and
lawyers in large firms that hire them, are needed to competently represent clients in such matters.
167. For a detailed discussion of these assertions and what underlie them, see Rubinson, supra
note 142, at 122-28.
168. This "moral" element is not only element of advocacy, but of adjudication itself. See Rubinson, supra note 142, at 127 (describing litigation as embodying a "morality tale").
169. A blog called "biglaw" is one example of this type of internal conversation. ABOVE THE LAW,
http://abovethelaw.com/biglaw/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2012).
170. See supra text accompanying notes 90-111.
171. The Am Law 100 2010-Gross Revenue: Baker &McKenzie Tops Skadden, AMERICAN LAWYER.COM, http://www.law.com/jsp/tal/PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=1202448484841 (last visited Apr. 7, 2012).
The two largest firms-Baker & McKenzie and Skadden-had profits in excess of $2 billion in 2009.
172. Horton, supra note 156, at 151 (arguing that "corporate lawyers" successful and "covertly"
limited the impact of legislation on their practice after the Enron scandal).
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A Scandal Every Now and Then

To say that large firms remain below the radar screen, however, is
something of a simplification. The profile of large firms does arise during
highly publicized corporate fraud cases. One notable example involved
Charles Keating and the Lincoln Savings & Loan scandal. As a result of
the Keating scandal, the large law firm Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays &
Handler was charged by the Office of Thrift Supervision with wrongdoing
in its representation of Keating and Keating's bank.17 3 The Enron scandal
was the preeminent event in recent years involving allegations of wrongdoing by large firm lawyers, and Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in
2001 in the wake of the scandal.17 4
In both of these instances and others, given the enormity of the fraud
and its economic consequences, there were publicly aired issues of "where
were the lawyers" along with "where were the accountants" and "where
were the ratings agencies."1 7 5 Time passes, however. For example, once
the smoke cleared and public interest waned regarding the Enron debacle,
the fundamental question to be answered was whether law firms should be
obligated to report wrongdoing on the part of their clients to the Securities
and Exchange Commission. The debate focused on the regulations that
implemented Sarbanes-Oxley-a technical process that garnered minimal
public attention. In the end, these regulations, after extensive lobbying by
the corporate bar, provided for discretionary-not obligatory-reporting,' 7 6 with some arguing that lawyers who represent organizations got
favorable treatment under the Act 1 7 because of their economic power.
It is telling that these instances demonstrate how episodic the focus is
on large corporate firms. A spectacular, large-scale fraud will emerge;
some debate about the role of lawyers in facilitating the fraud will take
place; and, then, with the passage of time, attention recedes until the next
large-scale fraud will come to light.1 78 These episodes retain none of the
durability and consistency that is the hallmark of professional identity as
advocacy. Large firms can deploy the substantial resources available to
them collectively to influence legislation once the initial wave of public and
173. The Keating affair generated a large scholarly response. For two particularly balanced treatments of the scandal, see Dennis E. Curtis, Old Knights and New Champions: Kaye, Scholer, the Office
of Thrift Supervision, and the Pursuitof the Dollar, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 985 (1993); William H. Simon,
The Kaye Scholer Affair: The Lawyer's Duty of Candor and the Bar's Temptations of Evasion and
Apology, 33 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 243, 259-67, 277 (1998). The matter was settled with Kaye Scholer
paying forty-one million dollars. Curtis, supra, at 1000.
174. 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2006).
175. Marianne C. Adams, Breaking Past the Parallax:Finding the True Place of Lawyers in Securities Fraud, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 953, 975 (2010) (the "question on everyone's lips after Enron, and
really after many corporate or securities scandals, [is] 'where were the lawyers?' ").
176. 17 C.F.R. § 205 (2011).
177. Horton, supra note 156. Horton argues that the political influence of "corporate lawyers"influence that operates below the radar screen of public scrutiny-led to favorable treatment under
Sarbanes-Oxley in contrast to "corporate officers and accountants," both of which "made easier legislative targets." Id. at 202.
178. Id.
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legislative indignation has worn off.179 In Llewellyn's terms there is no
"counter-specialization""so because all large firms have similar clients and
thereby have a collective interest in operating below the radar screen.
VI. THE

IMPOSSIBILITY AND INEVITABILITY OF

CHANGE

Two crucial questions remain regarding professional identity as advocacy. Is this dynamic good or bad? If bad, can it change?

What little attention has been focused on this general process tends to
view it as undermining the integrity of the profession and the rational consideration of the policy and legal issues that are raised. For example, one
scholar argues that the "language of fault" among opposing groups of lawyers generates suspicion and, ultimately, a refusal to legitimate the perspectives of their opponents.18 His solution is a call for an "alternative
discourse."18 2 Another commentator decries how each side in the tort reform debate seeks to "transform reality" to its advantage, and calls for a
more subtle, less strident debate that could generate a more "multi-dimensional" discourse. 8 3 Given the pervasiveness of the debate described in

this Article, it is, perhaps, surprising that these calls are relatively rare.
Most attention is focused on "civility" or declining "professionalism," 184
but these debates almost always focus on interactions between individual
lawyers in litigation, not on aggregations of opposing groups of lawyers
representing clients with consistently divergent interests.
Nevertheless, it is hard to disagree with the relatively few who do criticize professional identity as discourse. For sure, these debates raise crucial
issues. The personal injury debate raises important questions: the impact
of damage awards on the cost of medical care; the role of personal injury

attorneys as private attorneys general; access to justice at least in personal
injury cases for clients who otherwise cannot afford representation. These
are matters worth discussing. Accusing professional groups of greedy selfinterest while subverting truth and justice, however, hardly seems a productive means to foster constructive debate about public policy.
An even greater and less obvious impact of professional identity as
advocacy is its tendency to surface only some issues of public policy while
masking others. For example, the impact of personal injury damages on
businesses is certainly worth talking about. So is the impact of billions of
dollars of attorneys' fees incurred by businesses in retaining corporate lawyers in litigation against other businesses. It is, however, only the first that
179. See Horton, supra note 156, at 169-76 (discussing the quiet lobbying lawyer employed to
amend Sarbanes-Oxley to their advantage).
180. See supra text accompanying notes 37-42.
181. Burke, supra note 120, at 2131-37.
182. Id. at 2131.
183. Greenlee, supra note 106, at 734, 737.
184. One trend in this regard is the proliferation of "civility codes." Brenda Smith, Civility Codes:
The Newest Weapons in the "Civil" War over ProperAttorney Conduct Regulations Miss Their Mark, 24
U. DAYTON L. REV. 151. 152 (1998).

38

MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 31:7

generates scrutiny. Moreover, the tragedy of huge numbers of unrepresented litigants in matters which, by any measure, place fundamental
human needs-food, shelter, custody of children-at risk remains largely
invisible. There are few lawyers to "fight for your rights" in these cases,
and the few there are do not have the economic wherewithal to bring the
plight of their clients into the realm of popular or legislative discourse.
So what to do? One can call for a brighter, less professionally charged
future with hopes of a unified and serene professional brotherhood and
sisterhood and a more equitable vision of legal needs and issues. As a matter of conscious agency, of willed change, this is hard to imagine. This is not
a failure of imagination itself but a reflection of the limits of change in the
face of entrenched ways, supported by economic inequalities, of thinking
and doing."a' At the same time, there are trends in the profession which
suggest that change is not only possible, but that it is inevitable. This has to
do with shifting conceptions of what the practice of law is-a shift towards
a greater focus on problem-solving and "holistic" advocacy. This Article
concludes by exploring these contradictory trends:
A.

The Impossibility of Change

On one level, professional identity as advocacy is impervious to
change.18 6 Unlike a stalemate in chess, however, this does not signal the
end of the game but only a recipe for the war to continue unabated into the
foreseeable future.
In personal injury, substantial economic resources available to the
conflicting groups will likely generate continuing political battles on "tort
reform."1 87 Even the occasional "compromise" will only be a jumping-off
point for further identity advocacy or, alternatively, will only have minimal
impact.
In the area of criminal law, the constitutional structure underpinning
advocacy and the political impetus towards criminalization generates a durable structure with little chance for change. This is especially true given
the "good" versus "evil" narrative inherent in criminal cases, 188 which
lends itself to professional identity wars whatever the disproportionate resources available to prosecutors. And the stock figure of the politically
ambitious prosecutor and the defense attorney seeking to "get off"
185. The numbers of strategies of "heuristics" that contribute to this tendency are legion. To take
one example, there is the idea called "confirmation bias," "biased fact assimilation," or "anchoring"
through which humans view the world as confirming judgments already arrived at. See, e.g., MAX H.
BAZERMAN & MARGARET A. NEALE, NEGOTIATING RATIONALLY 54 (1992) ("people are more likely
to take at face value information they agree with and scrutinize more carefully information they
don't").
186. A good example is the idea of "caps" on contingent fees based on how far along a case gets,
with higher fees being earned if a case goes to trial. DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL

ETmics 840 (5th ed. 2009). Even such "compromise" measures are further compromised when clients
can waive such caps, which is how some jurisdictions handle these caps. Id.
187. See supra text accompanying notes 68-69.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 121, 138-40.
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criminals "on technicalities"1 8 9 remain deeply embedded in American culture and not likely to change in the foreseeable future.
B.

The Inevitability of Change

On the other hand, the conception of the legal professional appears to
be shifting. These changes will not affect the identity wars per se, but, interestingly, shift the meaning of professional identity itself.
In recent years there have been increasing calls for a new sense of
lawyers as managers of conflict, not as purveyors or intensifiers of conflict.' 90 These calls have appeared in an interlocking set of ideas and practices. One is mediation, with its focus on a collaborative vision of conflict
resolution that eschews the "zealous advocacy" of the prevailing professional and cultural norms of lawyering. 191 It is notable that despite mediation's heretofore "new age" reputation,192 mediation is not only practiced
in virtually all areas of the law, but it is specifically practiced in the context
of personal injuryl 93 and criminal law.194 Another is "problem-solving negotiation" with its emphasis on transparency and collaboration rather on
conventional strategies of negotiation. 19 5 Yet another is "collaborative
lawyering," which promotes collaboration with lawyers who explicitly de96
cline to represent their clients should the matter wind up in litigation.1
While usually associated with family law, collaborative law is spreading to
189. See supra text accompanying notes 138-41.
190. A good general overview of this shifting conception is Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer
as Consensus Builder: Ethics for a New Practice, 70 TENN. L. REV. 63 (2002); Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
The Lawyer as Problem Solver and Third-Party Neutral: Creativity and Non-Partisanship in Lawyering,
72 TEMPLE L. REV. 785 (1999).
191. The literature on mediation is vast. For particular treatments of the impact that the mediation boom will have on how lawyers represent clients, see Richard C. Reuben, The Lawyer Turns
Peacemaker: With Mediation Emerging as the Most Popular Form of Dispute Resolution, the Quest for
Common Ground Could Force Attorneys to Reinterpret Everything They Do in the Future, 82 A.B.A. J.
54 (1996); Craig A. McEwan, Nancy H. Rogers & Richard J. Maiman, Bring in the Lawyers: Challenging the Dominant Approaches to Ensuring Fairness in Divorce Mediation, 79 MINN. L. REV. 1317 (1995)
(describing empirical data demonstrating the positive impact attorneys can have in facilitating the mediation process); Jean Sternlight, Lawyers' Representation of Clients in Mediation: Using Economics and
Psychology To Structure Advocacy, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 269 (1999).
192. Judith Meyer, Mediators' Alert: Now, Certification Goes Global, 26 ALTERNATIVES To HIGH
CosT LITIGATION 67 (2008) (referring to how mediation was often viewed as a "new-age wild idea" and
is now "an accepted, institutionally embraced alternative to litigation").
193. See CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESs 54-55 (3d ed. 2003) (describing the
successful mediation of a personal injury claim).
194. Criminal law mediation is usually called "victim-offender mediation." See Catherine Pugh,
What Do You Get When You Add Megan Williams to Matthew Shepard and Victim-Offender Mediation? A Hate Crime Law that Prosecutors Will Actually Want to Use, 45 CAL. W. L. REV. 179 (2008);
Nancy Lucas, Restitution, Rehabilitation, Prevention, and Transformation: Victim-Offender Mediation
for First-Time Non-Violent Youthful Offenders, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1365 (2001). There is also a Victim Offender Mediation Association. VIcTIM OFFENDER MEDIATION ASSOCIATION, http://
www.voma.org/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2012).
195. An enormously influential text on this strategy is WILLIAM L. URY, ROGER FISHER, &
BRUCE M. PATTON, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (2d ed. 1992).
196. For an overview of the collaborative law process, see William H. Schwab, Collaborative
Lawering: A Closer Look at an Emerging Practice, 4 PEPP. Disp. RESOL. L.J. 351 (2004).
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different areas, including medical malpractice.' 97 Another trend is characterized as "holistic lawyering" which has taken root particularly in criminal
law cases.1 98 Holistic lawyering strives to, as one well-known criminal defense public defender organization characterizes it, "view[] clients not as
'cases,' but as whole people" with a commitment "to working with our clients, their families, and their communities to address the critical issues that
circumscribe their lives." 99
These trends are not the dreams of academics: each, as the preceding
citations demonstrate, are in the "real world." They may also become
more common and normalized as new generations of lawyers are educated
and begin to practice, advertise, and teach. If so, professional identity as
advocacy may recede, or at least become less strident, because notions of
"advocacy" itself will shift into a more collaborative mode. This shift is far
from inevitable, however, but the reality of the trends I have described "on
the ground" suggest that it is a very real possibility.
C.

And What of Organizationaland Low-Income Representation?

As I have described,2 00 the "masking" impact of professional identity
as advocacy is the most subtle and insidious of all its consequences. The
foundation of such masking runs deep, seemingly arising from the depths
of economic disparities and the inevitable impact that these resources have
on what gets noticed and what does not.
Even so, there are glimmers of change even here as well. The economics of large firms have changed given recent economic turbulence, although
whether this will lead to enduring structural change or the dissolution of
the "big firm" model remains to be seen. 20 ' The entrenched economic disparities in low-income representation remain seemingly impervious to
change, but even here new models of "community lawyering," with a focus
on attorney collaboration with communities and economic development
agencies in a non-litigation context, might modify the current model of individual and "impact" litigation.2 02 In addition, although the scandal of the
inequities of access to justice remains, there continue to be calls for something to be done, even among professional organizations and an attempt at
the expansion of pro bono by all lawyers. 203 Any hope for positive
197. Kathleen Clark, The Use of CollaborativeLaw in Medical ErrorSituations, 19 No. 6 HEALTH
L. 19 (2007).
198. Michael Pinard, Broadening the Holistic Mindset: IncorporatingCollateralConsequences and
Reentry into Criminal Defense Lawyering, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1067 (2004).
199. Bronx Defenders, BRIDGE BUILDERS, http://www.bridgebuilderscpi.org/content/bronx-defenders (last visited Apr. 11, 2012).
200. See supra text accompanying notes 142, 180.
201. For a provocative and recent examination of what the author calls "the death of big law," see
Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, 2010 Wisc. L. REV. 749 (2010).
202. For a general description of "community lawerying," see Scott L. Cummings, Community
Economic Development as Progressive Politics: Toward a GrassrootsMovement for Economic Justice,
54 STAN. L. REV. 399 (2001).
203. For perhaps the most comprehensive recent overview of access to justice, including a critique
of the legal profession's response to it, see DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE (2004).
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trends in access must be especially guarded, however, as I have argued
elsewhere.2 0 4
The impossibility/inevitability of change conundrum thus applies in
these two special contexts as well, although it would be a great leap of faith
indeed to hold that change will gain the upper hand.
VII. CONCLUSION
Professional identity as advocacy collapses the space between attorney
and client. The lawyer who specializes in representing one type of client
assumes the mangle of what is good, while, inevitably, in this specialist's
story, the counter-specialist is bad. The counter-specialist, in contrast, tells
a story that switches the roles of "good guy" and "bad guy." This creates a
fight for moral superiority. And yet the very public and strident nature of
the professional-identity debate hides other areas of the profession that
have substantial economic and social consequences. Professional identity
as advocacy renders both certain types of practice particularly salient while
rendering other types of practice invisible.
The mechanisms that create this process-specialization generating
counter-specialization20 and the morality tale these competing specialists
deploy against one another 206 -are difficult, if not impossible, to dislodge.
Nevertheless, perhaps the changing profession itself, without any "willed"
change on the part of individual attorneys or the profession as a whole, will
gradually neutralize these dynamics. As the coming years and decades unfold and as more collaborative models of what it means to be a lawyer take
hold, it is possible that the premises underlying professional identity as advocacy will recede. Attorneys who embrace these new models might serve
clients more effectively, and, bit by bit, the engine that generates professional identity will stop running. But even if this happens, low-income litigants who cannot afford lawyers appear, in large part, to be left out. It is
this invisible group-those who do not have lawyers either appointed for
them or willing to represent them because it is not economically viable to
do so-who need the most attention. Perhaps, in the end, some of the
efforts directed at opposing professional groups can be redirected to remedy the one place where lawyers do not go and where advocacy of any sort
is most needed.

204. Rubinson, supra note 142.
205. See supra text accompanying notes 37-42.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 43-65.

